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Abstract
The Decentralised Web (DW) has recently seen a renewed mo-
mentum, with a number of DW platforms like Mastodon, Peer-
Tube, and Hubzilla gaining increasing traction. These offer al-
ternatives to traditional social networks like Twitter, YouTube,
and Facebook, by enabling the operation of web infrastruc-
ture and services without centralised ownership or control.
Although their services differ greatly, modern DW platforms
mostly rely on two key innovations: first, their open source
software allows anybody to setup independent servers (“in-
stances”) that people can sign-up to and use within a local
community; and second, they build on top of federation pro-
tocols so that instances can mesh together, in a peer-to-peer
fashion, to offer a globally integrated platform.
In this paper, we present a measurement-driven exploration
of these two innovations, using a popular DW microblogging
platform (Mastodon) as a case study. We focus on iden-
tifying key challenges that might disrupt continuing efforts
to decentralise the web, and empirically highlight a number
of properties that are creating natural pressures towards re-
centralisation. Finally, our measurements shed light on the
behaviour of both administrators (i.e., people setting up in-
stances) and regular users who sign-up to the platforms, also
discussing a few techniques that may address some of the is-
sues observed.
1 Introduction
The “Decentralised Web” (DW) is an evolving concept, which
encompasses technologies broadly aimed at providing greater
transparency, openness, and democracy on the web [36]. To-
day, well known social DW platforms include Mastodon (a mi-
croblogging service), Diaspora (a social network), Hubzilla (a
cyberlocker), and PeerTube (a video sharing platform). Some
of these services offer decentralised equivalents to web giants
like Twitter and Facebook, mostly through the introduction of
two key innovations.
First, they decompose their service offerings into indepen-
dent servers (“instances”) that anybody can easily bootstrap.
In the simplest case, these instances allow users to register and
interact with each other locally (e.g., sharing videos), but they
also allow cross-instance interaction via the second innovation,
i.e., federation. This involves building on decentralised proto-
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cols to let instances interact and aggregate their users to offer
a globally integrated service.
DW platforms intend to offer a number of benefits. For ex-
ample, data is spread among many independent instances, thus
possibly making privacy-intrusive data mining more difficult.
Data ownership is more transparent, and the lack of centralisa-
tion could make the overall system more robust against techni-
cal, legal or regulatory attacks.
However, these properties may also bring inherent chal-
lenges that are difficult to avoid, particularly when consid-
ering the natural pressures towards centralisation in both so-
cial [12, 50] and economic [43] systems. For example, it is
unclear how such systems can securely scale-up, how wide-
area malicious activity might be detected (e.g., spam bots), or
how users can be protected from data loss during instance out-
ages/failures.
As the largest and most popular DW application [14, 35],
we choose Mastodon as a relevant example to study some of
these challenges in-the-wild. Mastodon is a decentralised mi-
croblogging platform, with features similar to Twitter. Any-
body can setup an independent instance by installing the nec-
essary software on a server. Once an instance has been created,
users can sign up and begin posting “toots,” which are shared
with followers. Via federation, they can also follow accounts
registered with other remote instances. Unlike traditional so-
cial networks, this creates an inter-domain (federated) model,
not that dissimilar to the inter-domain model of the email sys-
tem.
In this paper, we present a large-scale (case) study of the
DW aiming to understand the feasibility and challenges of run-
ning decentralised social web systems. We use a 15-month
dataset covering Mastodon’s instance-level and user-level ac-
tivity, covering 67 million toots. Our analysis is performed
across two key axes: (i) We explore the deployment and nature
of instances, and how the uncoordinated nature of instance ad-
ministrators drive system behaviours (Section 4); and (ii) We
measure how federation impacts these properties, and intro-
duces unstudied availability challenges (Section 5). A com-
mon theme across our findings is the discovery of various pres-
sures that drive greater centralisation; we therefore also ex-
plore techniques that could reduce this propensity.
Main Findings. Overall, our main findings include:
1. Mastodon enjoys active participation from both admin-
istrators and users. There are a wide range of instance
types, with tech and gaming communities being quite
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prominent. Certain topics (e.g., journalism) are covered
by many instances, yet have few users. In contrast, other
topics (e.g., adult material) have a small number of in-
stances but a large number of users.
2. There are user-driven pressures towards centralisation.
Popularity in Mastodon is heavily skewed towards a few
instances, driving implicit forms of centralisation. 10%
of instances host almost half of the users. This means that
a small subset of administrators have a disproportionate
impact on the federated system.
3. There are infrastructure-driven pressures towards cen-
tralisation. Due to the simplicity and low costs, there
is notable co-location of instances within a small set of
hosting providers. We find that failures in these ASes can
create a ripple effect that fragments the wider federated
graph. For example, the Largest Connected Component
(LCC) in the social follower graph reduces from 92% of
all users to 46% by outages in five ASes. We observe 6
cases of these AS-wide outages within our measurement
period. We also observe regular outages by individual in-
stances (likely due to the voluntary nature of many ad-
ministrators). Again, this has a notable impact: 11% of
instances are unavailable for half of our measurement pe-
riod.
4. There are content-driven pressures towards centralisa-
tion. Due to the differing popularities of toots, we find
that outages in just 10 instances could remove 62.69% of
global toots. To ameliorate this problem, we explore the
potential of building toot replication schemes. For exam-
ple, when a user has followers from different instances,
the content posted by the user could be stored and indexed
(persistently) in the followers’ instances. By enabling this
type of federation-based replication, availability improves
so that only 11.4% of toots are lost when the top 3 ASes
are offline (rather than 70% without).
2 Mastodon
In this section, we describe the basic operation of Mastodon,
highlighting key terminology in bold. We refer readers inter-
ested in more details to a tutorial on The Verge [13].
Mastodon is an open-source DW server platform released in
2016 [33]. It offers microblogging functionality, allowing ad-
ministrators to create their own independent Mastodon servers,
aka instances. Each unique Mastodon instance works much
like Twitter, allowing users to register new accounts and post
toots to their followers. Users can also boost toots, which is
the equivalent of retweeting in Twitter.
Instances can work in isolation, only allowing locally regis-
tered users to follow each other. However, Mastodon instances
can also federate, whereby users registered on one instance
can follow users registered on another instance. This is me-
diated via the local instances of the two users. Hence, each
Mastodon instance maintains a list of all remote accounts its
users follow; this results in the instance subscribing to posts
performed on the remote instance, such that they can be pulled
and presented to local users. For simplicity, we refer to users
registered on the same instance as local, and users registered
on different instances as remote. Note that a user registered on
their local instance does not need to register with the remote in-
stance to follow the remote user. Instead, a user just creates a
single account with their local instance; when the user wants
to follow a user on a remote instance, the user’s local instance
performs the subscription on the user’s behalf. This process
is implemented using an underlying subscription protocol. To
date, Mastodon supports two open protocols: oStatus [37] and
ActivityPub [1] (starting from v1.6). This makes Mastodon
compatible with other decentralised microblogging implemen-
tations (notably, Pleroma).
When a user logs in to their local instance, they are pre-
sented with three timelines: (i) a home timeline, with toots
posted by the accounts whom the user follows; (ii) a local time-
line, with all the toots generated within the same instance; and
(iii) a federated timeline, with all toots that have been retrieved
from remote instances. The latter is not limited to remote toots
that the user follows; rather, it is the union of remote toots re-
trieved by all users on the instance. The federated timeline is
an innovation driven by Mastodon’s decentralised nature; it al-
lows users to observe and discover toots by remote users, and
broaden their follower network.
3 Datasets
The goal of our paper is to better understand the nature of in-
stances and federation, using Mastodon as a case study. To
do so, we rely on three primary datasets: (i) Instances: regu-
lar snapshots of instance metadata and availability; (ii) Toots:
historical user posts (toots) available on each instance; and
(iii) Graphs: the follower and federation graphs.
Instances. We first extracted a global list of instance URLs
and availability statistics from a dump provided by the mnm.
social website. This site contains a comprehensive index of in-
stances around the world, allowing us to compile a set of 4,328
unique instances (identified by their domain). These instances
primarily run the Mastodon server software, although 3.1% run
the Pleroma software (https://pleroma.social/) instead. This is
because, since 2017, these two implementations have feder-
ated together using the same front-end and federation protocol
(ActivityPub). Hence, from a user’s perspective, there is little
difference between using Mastodon or Pleroma instances.
We obtain our data by using the monitoring service of
mnm.social. Every five minutes, mnm.social connected to
each instance’s 〈instance.name〉/api/v1/instance API endpoint.
The instance API returned the following information from each
instance: name, version, number of toots, users, federated sub-
scriptions, and user logins; whether registration is open and if
the instance is online.
The data on mnm.social goes back to April 11, 2017. We
collected all the data until July 27, 2018. Maxmind was then
used to map the IP address of each instance to their country
and hosted Autonomous System (AS). Although some of these
metadata items rarely change (e.g., country), repeatedly fetch-
ing all the data every five minutes gives us fine-grained tempo-
2
ral data revealing how values evolved across time. Overall, we
observe approximately half a billion data points.
Toots. In May 2018, we crawled all available toots across the
instances. To compile a list of instances to crawl, we started
with the list collected via the mnm.social website. We then
filtered these to only leave instances that were online during
May 2018: this left 1.75K active instances which were acces-
sible. This obviously reveals a degree of churn in the instance
population; across the 15 month measurement cycle 21.3% of
instance went offline and never came back online. We wrote
a multi-threaded crawler to connect with each of these 1.75K
instances, via their API, and collected their entire history of
toots. To expedite the process, we parallelised this across 10
threads on 7 machines. Each thread was responsible for query-
ing the federated timeline of its designated instance, iterating
over the entire history of toots on the instance. To avoid over-
whelming instances, we introduced artificial delays between
API calls to limit any effects on the instance operations. For
each toot, the following data were collected: username, toot
URL, creation date, media attachments, number of favorites,
followers, and followings, toot contents, and hashtags.
Our toots dataset contains 67M public toots, generated by
239K unique users. By comparing this against the publicly
listed metadata obtained from the instance dataset (recall this
contained toot and user counts), we find that our dataset covers
62% of the entire toot population. The remaining 38% of toots
could not be collected: approximately 20% of these toots were
set to private, and the remainder were hosted on instances that
blocked toot crawling.
Follower and Federation Graphs. We also crawled the fol-
lowers and following lists for users in July 2018. To this end,
we scraped the follower relationships for the 239K users we
encountered who have tooted at least once. This was per-
formed be iterating over all public users on each instance, and
simply paging through their (HTML) follower list.1 This pro-
vided us with the ego networks for each user. We identified
a user by their account name on a per-instance basis, as users
must create one account per instance. 87.9% of account names
are unique to a single instance, while 8.3% are on two instances
and 3.8% are on three or more. Note that it is impossible to
infer if such accounts are owned by the same person and there-
fore we treat them as separate nodes.
We then induced a graph, G
(
V,E
)
, in which user Vi has a
directed link to another user Vj if Vi follows Vj . This resulted
in 853K user accounts, and 9.25M follower links. Conceptu-
ally, this graph is similar to the Twitter follower graph [27].
However, unlike Twitter, users can follow accounts on re-
mote instances, triggering the need for remote subscriptions
between instances (i.e., federation). Hence, the creation of a
link in E can trigger an underlying federated subscription be-
tween the respective instances. We therefore created a sec-
ond graph, GF
(
I, E
)
, which consists of instance-to-instance
subscriptions (hereafter instance federation graph, for short).
GF
(
I, E
)
is induced by G
(
V,E
)
; a directed edge Eab exists
1https://〈instance.name〉/users/〈user.name〉/followers
between instances Ia and Ib if there is at least one user on Ia
who follows a user on Ib.
Twitter. For comparisons, we also gathered data about out-
ages in Twitter as well as its social network, dating back to
when Twitter was at a similar age as Mastodon is now. For
uptime statistics, we used pingdom.com, a widely used web-
site monitoring platform which probed Twitter every minute
between February and December 2007 (when Twitter was
roughly 1.5 years old). The data is obtained from the Inter-
net Archive [22]. As a baseline social graph, we obtained the
Twitter social graph from a 2011 dataset [30], which consists
of users and their respective follower networks.
Limitations. Our analysis reveals a highly dynamic system
and, thus, our measurements are capturing a “moving target.”
Similarly, we highlight that the timelines of each dataset differ
slightly due to the progressive deployment of our measurement
infrastructure. This, however, does not impact our subsequent
analysis. It is also worth noting that we do not have com-
prehensive data on all toots, due to some instances preventing
crawling (we have 62% of toots). Thus, we have avoided per-
forming deeper semantic analysis on toot content and, instead,
focus on instance-level activities.
Ethical Considerations. The instances dataset only contains
public infrastructure information, whereas, the toots dataset
covers user information, and this might have privacy implica-
tions. However, we have exclusively collected public toot data,
followed well established ethical procedures for social data,
and obtained a waiver from the ethics committee at Queen
Mary University of London. All data is anonymised before
usage, it is stored within a secure silo, and we have removed
text content from our analysis. Finally, note that our public
dataset only covers infrastructure information and anonymised
toot metadata.
4 Exploring Instances
The first innovation that the DW introduces is the distribu-
tion of services across independent instances. This means that
these platforms emerge in a bottom-up fashion from the thou-
sands of instances running their software. Hence, inspecting
them provides a window into how bottom-up DW decisions
are made, and the implications they might have on the overall
system. In this section, we perform a characterisation of the
instances available in Mastodon, and how they are deployed.
4.1 Instance Popularity
First, we quantify the growth and popularity of the 4,328
instances under study, and inspect how this relates to instance
settings.
Instance Growth. We begin by briefly inspecting the recent
growth of Mastodon. Figure 1 plots the timeseries of the num-
ber of instances, users, and toots available per day. Mastodon
is in a phase of growing popularity, with fluctuations driven
by the arrival and departure of instances. Between April and
June 2017, there was an increase in the number of instances
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Figure 1: Available instances/user/toots over-time.
(and users). However, while the number of instances reaches a
plateau around July 2017 (only 6% of the instances were setup
between July and December 2017), the user population contin-
ues to grow during this period (by 22%). Then, in the first half
of 2018, new instances start to appear again (43% growth).
We conjecture that this may have been driven by things like
the #DeleteFacebook campaign (popular at that time) [45], and
sporadic bursts of media attention [13, 36, 42]. Closer inspec-
tion also reveals fluctuations in the instance population; this
churn is driven by short periods of unavailability, where cer-
tain instances go offline (temporarily). We posit that this may
have wider implications, and therefore deep dive into this in
Section 4.4.
Open vs. Closed Instances. Mastodon instances can be sep-
arated into two groups: (i) open, allowing anybody to register
(47.8% of instances); and (ii) closed, requiring an explicit in-
vitation from the administrator (52.2%). Figure 2(a) presents
a CDF of the number of users and toots per-instance, sepa-
rated into open and closed instances. Overall, the user popula-
tion distribution is highly skewed, with distinct traits of natural
centralisation. For both kinds of instances (open and closed)
the top 5% of all instances have 90.6% of all users. Simi-
lar patterns can be seen among toot generation, with the top
5% of instances accumulating 94.8% of toots. This of course
confirms that, despite its decentralisation, Mastodon does not
escape the power law trends observed in other social plat-
forms [10, 16, 27, 49].
Unsurprisingly, instances with an open registration process
have substantially more users (mean 613 vs. 87). Inspecting
user count alone, however, can be quite misleading, as open in-
stances may accumulate more experimental (and disengaged)
users. Figure 2(b) presents the breakdown of users, instances
and toots across open and closed instances. Whereas the ma-
jority of users are associated with open instances, they create
on average 94.8 toots per-person. In contrast, there are fewer
users on closed instances, but they generate more toots per-
capita (average of 186.65). To measure the activity level of
users, each week, we compute the percentage of users who
have actually logged into each instance (available in the in-
stance dataset), and take the maximum percentage as the activ-
ity level of the instance. Figure 2(c) presents the CDFs of the
activity level per instance. This confirms that closed instances
have more engaged populations: the median percentage of ac-
tive users per closed instance is 75%, compared to 50% for
active users in open instances. Despite this mix of instances,
it is clear that a notable fraction of Mastodon users regularly
login; for example, 13.73% of users use Mastodon over once
per-week). This disparity in usage patterns, which is typical
in any web system, does however increase the “dominance” of
the instances that are associated with more active users.
4.2 Instance Categories
To improve visibility and/or to specialise in certain topics,
instances can explicitly “tag” themselves with a category, as
well as the activities they allow. Thus, these tags help in un-
derstanding the types of ongoing activities within Mastodon.
Category Tags. Overall, 697 out of the 4,328 instances report
a self-declared category, taken from a controlled taxonomy of
tags. Just 13.6% of users and 14.4% of toots are associated
with these categorised instances. 51.7% of these categories are
labelled as “generic”. Despite this relatively low coverage, it
is still useful to inspect these tags to gain insight into ongoing
usage. Note that the following statistics pertain to this subset
of instances. Figure 3 plots the distribution of instances, toots,
and users across each category. We identify 15 categories of
instances. The majority of instances are categorised as tech
(55.2%), games (37.3%) or art (30.15%). This is not entirely
surprising, as Mastodon emerged from the tech community.
Figure 3 also allows us to compare the popularity of each
category when measured by number of instance vs. number
of users, shedding light on the interests of the administrators
vs. the general user population. Overall, the interests of these
two groups coincide, albeit with some key discrepancies. For
instance, while tech covers 55.2% of instances, it only gar-
ners 20.8% of users and 24.5% of toots. By contrast, games
corresponds to 37.3% of instances, yet generate 43.43% of all
toots, suggesting they are highly active. Similar observations
apply to Anime instances, where 24.6% of instances contribute
37.23% of global toots. There is, however, one clear outlier:
adult instances constitute only 12.3% of instances but attract
61.03% of all users; that is, adult content is clearly a topic at-
tracting a large user population, which is served by a small
set of instances. This has been observed in other forms of
online adult content, where websites with limited content sets
gain large per-item interest [48]. These contrasts suggest that
Mastodon is a powerful tool for exploring and evaluating the
differing behaviours of these communities.
Activity Tags. Due to its decentralised nature, it is also pos-
sible for individual administrators to stipulate what types of
activity are allowed on their instances. This is necessary in a
federated social network, as each instance can have different
policy requirements. Out of the 697 instances, 17.5% allow all
types of activity. The remaining instances explicitly specify a
subset of activities acceptable on the instance. 82% of these list
at least one prohibited activity, whereas 93% explicitly specify
at least one acceptable activity.
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Figure 2: Dissecting Instances with open and closed (invite-only) registrations. (a) Distribution of number of toots and users per-instance (b)
Number of instances, toots and users for open and closed registrations; (c) Distribution of active users (max percentage of users logged-in in a
week per instance) across all instances.
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various categories.
Figure 4 reports the number of instances, users, and toots
associated with each activity category. The most regularly
prohibited activity (left bar chart in the figure) is spam. 76%
of instances disallow it, followed by pornography (66%), and
nudity (62%). These two activities are typically only prohib-
ited when not tagged with #NSFW (not safe for work): for
instances that allow #NSFW, the vast majority also allow nu-
dity (84.3%) and pornography (75.6%). On the other hand,
and quite curiously, some instances explicitly allow several of
these activities (see right bar chart in Figure 4), e.g., 24% of in-
stances allow spam. Unsurprisingly, these get few users: even
though they make up 21% of instances, they only hold 16% of
users. In contrast, instances allowing advertising have dispro-
portionately large user groups (47% of instances, but 61% of
users hosting and 75% of the toots).
Mastodon UI also has a “content warning” (CW) checkbox
for the posters to give advance notice that there are spoilers in
the content. Interestingly, while many instances prohibit post-
ing spoilers without a content warning, many more explicitly
allow this.
4.3 Instance Hosting
Unlike a centrally administered deployment, where presence
can be intelligently selected, Mastodon’s infrastructure follows
050
%
Prohibited
0 50 100
%
Allowed
Nudity with #NSFW
Porno with #NSFW
Spoilers w/o CW
Advertising
Links to
illegal content
Nudity w/o #NSFW
Porno w/o #NSFW
Spam
Instances Toots Users
Figure 4: Distribution of instances and users across instances
w.r.t. prohibited and allowed categories.
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Figure 5: Distribution of instances, users, and toots across the top-5
countries (top) and ASes (bottom).
a bottom-up approach, where administrators independently de-
cide where they place their instance. Figure 5 presents a break-
down of the presence of instances, toots, and users across
countries and Autonomous Systems (ASes).
Countries. Japan dominates in terms of the number of in-
stances, users and toots. In total, it hosts 25.5% of all instances,
closely followed by the US which hosts 21.4%. Closer inspec-
tion reveals that the ratio between the number of instances and
5
Figure 6: Distribution of federated subscription links between coun-
tries. The left axis lists the top-5 countries, and the lower access indi-
cates the fraction of the federated links to instances in other countries.
number of users differ across countries though. For example,
Japan hosts a just quarter of instances, yet gains 41% of all
users; in contrast, France hosts 16% of instances, yet accu-
mulates only 9.2% of users. It is also worth noting that these
countries are heavily interconnected, as instances must feder-
ate together, i.e., users on one instance may follow users on
another instance (thereby creating federated subscription links
between them, see Section 2).
To capture their interdependency, Figure 6 presents a Sankey
diagram; along the left axis are the top countries hosting in-
stances, and the graph depicts the fraction of their federated
subscriptions to instances hosted in other countries (right axis).
Unsurprisingly, the instances exhibit homophily: users of an
instance follow other users on instances in the same country,
e.g., 32% of federated links are with instances in the same
country. The top 5 countries attract 93.66% of all federated
subscription links. We posit that this dependency on a small
number of countries may undermine the initial motivation for
the DW, as large volumes of data are situated within just a
small number of jurisdictions; e.g., 89.1% of all toots reside
on instances in Japan, the US, and France.
ASes. Next, we inspect the distribution of instances across
ASes; this is important as an over-dependence on a single AS,
may raise questions related to data pooling or even system re-
silience. When looking at the ASes that host Mastodon servers
(bottom of Figure 5), we observe instances spread across 351
ASes. On average, each AS therefore hosts 10 instances. This
suggests a high degree of distribution, without an overt depen-
dence on a single AS.
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That said, due to the varying popularity of these instances,
the top three ASes account for almost two thirds (62%) of all
global users, with the largest one (Amazon) hosting more than
30% of all users—even though it only is used by 6% of in-
stances. Cloudflare also plays a prominent role, with 31.7%
of toots across 5.4% of instances. The reasons for this co-
location are obvious: Administrators are naturally attracted to
well known and low cost providers. Whereas, a centrally or-
chestrated deployment might replicate across multiple redun-
dant ASes (as often seen with CDNs), this is more difficult in
the DW context because each instance is independently man-
aged (without coordination). Although these infrastructures
are robust, the failure (or change in policy) of a small set of
ASes could therefore impact a significant fraction of users.
Again, this highlights another form of tacit centralisation that
emerges naturally within such deployments.
4.4 Instance Availability
We next explore the availability properties emerging from
the bottom-up deployment. Here, we define availability as the
ability to access and download its homepage. We posit that the
uncoordinated and (semi-)voluntary nature of some instance
operations may result in unusual availability properties.
Instance Availability. We start by measuring the historical
availability of our 4.3K instances over time (from the instance
dataset). We only count outages where an instance becomes
unavailable, and then returns again within our 15 month mea-
surement cycle (i.e., we do not consider persistently failed in-
stances as outages). Figure 7 plots the distribution of down-
time of each instance over a 5-minute granularity (blue line,
bottom X-axis). A sizeable portion of instances do have rela-
tively good availability properties – about half of the instances
have less than 5% downtime. 4.5% of instances were even up
for 99.5% of the time (these popular instances covered 44% of
toots). However, there is a long tail of extremely poor avail-
abilities: 11% of instances are inaccessible more than half of
the time, which confirms that failures are relatively common-
place in Mastodon. This has obvious repercussions for both
toot availability and the ability of users to access the platform.
We cannot confirm the exact reasons for unavailability, nor
can we state how reliable instances maintain their long uptime
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Figure 8: Distribution of per-day downtime (measured every five
minutes) of Mastodon instances (binned by number of toots), and
Twitter (Feb–Dec 2007).
(although the operators might be employing load balancers and
replicated back-ends). That said, it is likely that the voluntar-
ily nature of many instance operators has a role, i.e., instances
with poor availability might simply be unpopular, and lack
dedicated administrators. To test this, we count the number
of toots and users that are unavailable during instance failures,
see Figure 7 (red lines, top x-axis). Instances may go down
multiple times, so we select the 95th percentile of these val-
ues for each instance. Disproving our hypothesis, we find that
failures happen on instances across the entire spectrum of pop-
ularity — there are a number of instances that host in excess of
100K toots which have outages.
This is further explored in Figure 8, which presents a box
plot of daily downtime for Mastodon, where we separate in-
stances based on their number of toots. Although small in-
stances (<10K toots) clearly have the most downtime (median
12%), those with over 1M toots actually have worse availabil-
ity than instances with between 100K and 1M (2.1% vs. 0.34%
median downtime). In fact, the correlation between the number
of toots on an instance and its downtime is -0.04, i.e., instance
popularity is not a good predictor of availability. The fig-
ure also includes Twitter’s downtime in 2007 for comparison
(see Section 3). Although we see a number of outliers, even
Twitter, which was famous for its poor availability (the “Fail
Whale” [28]), had better availability compared to Mastodon:
its average downtime was just 1.25% vs. 10.95% for Mastodon
instances.
Certificate Dependencies. Another possible reason for fail-
ures is third party dependencies, e.g., TLS certificate prob-
lems (Mastodon uses HTTPS by default). To test if this may
have caused issues, we take the certificate registration data
from crt.sh [11], and check which certificate authorities (CAs)
are used by instances, presented in Figure 9(a). Let’s Encrypt
has been chosen as CA for more than 85% of the instances,
likely because this service offers good automation and is free
of cost [31]. This, again, confirms a central dependency in
the DW. We also observe that certificate expiry is a notice-
able issue (perhaps due to non-committed administrators). Fig-
ure 9(b) presents the number of instances that have outages
caused by the expiry of their certificates. In the worst case
we find 105 instances to be down on one day (23 July 2018),
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Figure 9: (a) Footprint of certificate authorities among the instances.
(b) Unavailability of instances (on a per-day basis).
ASN Instances Failures IPs Users Toots Org. RankPeers
AS9370 97 1 95 33.4K 3.89M Sakura 2.0K 10
AS20473 22 4 21 5.7K 936K Choopa 143 150
AS8075 12 7 12 1.7K 35.4K Microsoft 2.1K 257
AS12322 9 15 9 123 4.4K Free SAS 3.2K 63
AS2516 9 4 8 559 102K KDDI 70 123
AS9371 8 14 8 165 4.7K Sakura 2.4K 3
Table 1: AS failures per number of hosted instances. Rank refers
to CAIDA AS Rank, and Peers is the number of networks the AS
peers [8].
removing nearly 200K toots from the system. Closer inspec-
tion reveals that this was caused by the Let’s Encrypt CA short
expiry policy (90 days), which simultaneously expired certifi-
cates for all 105 instances. In total, these certificate expira-
tions were responsible for 6.3% of the outages observed in our
dataset.
AS Dependencies. Another potential explanation for some in-
stance unavailability is that AS-wide network outages might
occur. Due to the co-location of instances within the same AS,
this could obviously have a widespread impact. To test this,
we correlate the above instance unavailability to identify cases
where all instances in a given AS simultaneously fail — this
may indicate an AS outage. Table 1 presents a summary of the
most frequent failures (we consider it to be an AS failure if all
instances hosted in the same AS became unavailable simulta-
neously). We only include ASes that host at least 8 instances
(to avoid mistaking a small number of failures as an entire AS
failure). We observe a small but notable set of outages. In to-
tal, 6 ASes suffer an outage. The largest is by AS9370 (Sakura,
a Japanese hosting company), which lost 97 instances simulta-
neously, rendering 3.89M toots unavailable. The AS with most
outages (15) is AS12322 (Free SAS), which removed 9 in-
stances. These outages are responsible for less than 1% of the
failures observed, however, their impact is still significant. In
total, these AS outages resulted in the (temporary) removal of
4.98M toots from the system, as well as 41.5K user accounts.
Although this centralisation can result in such vulnerabilities,
the decentralised management of Mastodon makes it difficult
for administrators to coordinate placement to avoid these “hot
spots”.
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Outage durations. Finally, for each outage, we briefly com-
pute its duration and plot the CDF in Figure 10 (blue line, Y1-
axis). While almost all instances (98%) go down at least once,
a quarter of them are unavailable for at least one day before
coming back online, ranging from 1 day (21%) to over a month
(7%). Figure 10 also reports the number of toots and users
affected by the outages: 14% of users cannot access their in-
stances for a whole day at least once. Naturally, these measures
are closely correlated to toot unavailability (i.e., toots become
unavailable when their host instance goes offline). In the worst
case, we find one day (April 15, 2017) where 6% of all (global)
toots were unavailable for the whole day. These findings sug-
gest a need for more reslient approaches to DW management.
5 Exploring Federation
The previous section has explored the central role of indepen-
dent instances within the Mastodon ecosystem. The other ma-
jor innovation introduced by the DW is federation. Here we
inspect federation through two lenses: (i) the federated sub-
scription graph that interconnects instances (Section 5.1); and
(ii) the distributed placement and sharing of content (toots) via
this graph (Section 5.2). This section studies the resilience
properties of DW federation in light of the frequent failures
observed earlier.
5.1 Breaking the User Federation
Federation allows users to create global follower links
with users on other instances. This means that instance
outages (Section 4.4) can create a transitive ripple effect,
e.g., if three users on different instances follow each other,
U1 → U2 → U3, then the failure of the instance hosting U2
would also disconnectU1 andU3 (assuming that no other paths
exist). To highlight the risk, Figure 11 presents the degree dis-
tribution of these graphs, alongside a snapshot of the Twitter
follower graph (see Section 3). We observe traditional power
law distributions across all three graphs. Although natural, this
creates clear points of centralisation, as outages within highly
connected nodes will have a disproportionate impact on the
overall graph structure [3].
To add context to these highly connected instances, Ta-
ble 2 summarises the graph properties of the top 10 instances
(ranked by the number of toots generated on their timeline). As
well as having very high degree within the graphs, we also note
that these popular instances are operated by a mix of organisa-
tions, including companies (e.g., Pixiv and Dwango), individ-
uals, and crowd-funding. Ideally, important instances should
have stable and predictable funding. Curiously, we find less
conventional business models, e.g., vocalodon.net, an instance
dedicated to music that funds itself by creating compilation al-
bums from user contributions.
Impact of Removing Users. The above findings motivate us
to explore the impact of removing nodes from these graphs.
Although we are primarily interested in infrastructure outages,
we start by evaluating the impact of removing individual users
from the social graph, G
(
V,E
)
. This would happen by users
deleting their accounts. Such a failure is not unique to the
DW, and many past social networks have failed simply by
users abandoning them [46]. Here, we repeat past method-
ologies to test the resilience of the social graph by removing
the top users and computing two metrics: (i) the size of the
Largest Connected Component (LCC), which represents the
maximum potential number of users that toots can be propa-
gated to (via shares); and (ii) the number of disconnected com-
ponents, which relates to the number of isolated communities
retaining internal connectivity for propagating toots. These
metrics have been used to characterise the attack and error tol-
erance of social and other graphs [3, 23, 51].
We proceed in rounds, removing the top 1% of remaining
nodes in each iteration, and computing the size of the LCC in
the remaining graph, as well as the number of new components
created by the removal of crucial connecting nodes. Figure 12
presents the results as a sensitivity graph. The results confirm
that the user follower graph is extremely sensitive to removing
the highly connected users. Although Mastodon appears to
be a strong social graph, with 99.95% of users in the LCC,
removing just the top 1% of accounts decreases the LCC to
26.38% of all users.
As a comparison, we use the Twitter social graph from 2011
when Twitter was a similar age as Mastodon is now (and be-
set with frequent “fail whale” appearances [28]). Without any
node removals, Twitter’s LCC contained 95% of users [10]; re-
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Toots from #Home Users Toots Instances
Domain Home Users Users OD ID OD ID OD ID Run by AS (Country)
mstdn.jp 9.87M 23.2K 22.5K 24.7K 71.4M 1.94M 1352 1241 Individual Cloudflare (US)
friends.nico 6.54M 8998 8809 23.3K 37.4M 2.57M 1273 1287 Dwango Amazon (JP)
pawoo.net 4.72M 30.3K 27.6K 15.4K 34.9M 1.4M 1162 1106 Pixiv Amazon (US)
mimumedon.com 3.29M 1671 507 7510 435K 366K 420 524 Individual Sakura (JP)
imastodon.net 2.34M 1237 772 10.8K 2.37M 1.52M 711 865 Individuals (CF) Amazon (US)
mastodon.social 1.65M 26.6K 24.8K 16.1K 30.9M 525K 1442 1083 Individual (CF) Online SAS (FR)
mastodon.cloud 1.54M 5375 5209 106 7.35M 337 1198 39 Unknown Cloudflare (US)
mstdn-workers.com 1.35M 610 576 12.5K 4.18M 1.98M 735 850 Individual (CF) Amazon (JP)
vocalodon.net 914K 672 653 8441 2.6M 853K 981 631 Bokaro bowl (A) Sakura (JP)
mstdn.osaka 803K 710 363 1.64K 2.68M 2.1M 561 862 Individual Google (US)
Table 2: Top 10 instances as per number of toots from the home timeline. (OD: Out Degree, ID: In Degree, CF: Crowd-funded, A: maintained
by selling Bokaro Bowl album).
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Figure 12: Impact of removing user accounts from G
(
V,E
)
. Each
iteration (X axis) represents the removal of the remaining 1% of the
highest degree nodes.
moving the top 10% still leaves 80% of users within the LCC.
This confirms that Mastodon’s social graph, by comparison,
is far more sensitive to user removals. Although we expect
that the top users on any platform will be more engaged, and
therefore less likely to abandon the platform, the availability of
top users to every other user cannot be guaranteed since there
is no central provider and instance outages may remove these
users. Indeed, individual instance failures, which we examine
next, can take out huge subsets of users from the global social
graph.
Impact of Removing Instances. As discussed earlier, in-
stance failures are not uncommon, and can have an impact
that exceeds their local user base due to the (federated) cross-
instance interconnectivity of users in the social follower graph.
Therefore, we next measure the resilience of the instance fed-
eration graph (GF ). In Figure 13(a), we report the impact of
instance failures on GF . We iteratively remove the top N in-
stances, ordered by their size; we rank by both number of users
(red) and number of toots (green). When ranking via either
metric, we notice a remarkably robust linear decay in the size
of the LCC, and a corresponding increase in the number of
components.
Unlike the drastic breakdown of the social graph, this ele-
gant degradation is caused by the more uniform degree distri-
bution of the federation graph (as compared against traditional
social networks [6]). We emphasise that the instance federa-
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Figure 13: Impact of node removal attacks. Each subfigure measures,
on Y1 axis, LCC and, on Y2 axis, the number of components for
GF
(
I, E
)
, by removing: (a) the top N instances (each node in GF
is an instance); and (b) the top N Autonomous Systems, including all
instances hosted within.
tion graph shows the potential connectivity of instances. How-
ever, individual instance failures would still have an enormous
impact on the social graph.
Impact of Removing ASes. As discussed earlier, many in-
stances are co-located in a small number of hosting ASes. We
now inspect the impact of removing entire ASes, and thus all
instances hosted within. Naturally, this is a far rarer occurrence
than instance failures, yet they do occur (see Section 4.4). We
do not present this as a regular situation, but one that represents
the most damaging theoretical impact. For context, AS-wide
collapse might be caused by catastrophic failures within the
AS itself [20, 29] or via their network interconnections [17].
Figure 13(b) presents the LCC and number of components
for GF , while iteratively removing the ASes, ranked by both
the number of instances (blue) and number of users (red). At
first, we see that 92% of all instances are within a single LCC.
This LCC covers 96% of all users. The graph shows that
removing large ASes, measured by the number of instances
(blue), has a significant impact on GF . The size of the largest
connected component decreases similarly whether we remove
the largest ASes when ranked by instances hosted (blue) or
by number of users (red). However, the number of connected
components in GF increases drastically when we remove the
ASes hosting the largest users rather than ASes ranked by num-
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Figure 14: Ratio of home toots (produced on the instance) to remote
toots (replicated from other ones).
ber of instances: the removal of just 5 ASes shatters the feder-
ation graph into 272 components when sorted by users hosted,
compared to just 139 when ranking by the #instances in the
AS. This is explained by the central role of a few ASes: the
top 5 ASes by users cover only 20% of instances (yet com-
prise 85% of users); when ranked by number of instances, the
top 5 covers 42% of instances (and 33.6% of users).
Thus, when AS failures occur, Mastodon shows signifi-
cantly worse resilience properties than previously seen for just
instance failures (Figure 13(a)). This is driven by the fact
that the top five ASes by number of instances hosted — OVH
SAS (FR), Scaleway (FR), Sakura Internet (JP), Hetzner On-
line (DE), and GMO Internet (JP) — account for 42% of all
instances. Their removal yields a 49% reduction in the size
of LCC in the federation graph, leaving behind an LCC which
only covers 45% of instances and 66% of users. This consti-
tutes a radical drop in the capacity of Mastodon to dissem-
inate toots via the federated subscription links. Indeed, re-
moving them not only wipes out a large number of nodes, but
also results in a smaller number of components which still re-
main. That said, the linear degradation of the instance feder-
ation graph discussed previously provides some limited pro-
tection against a more catastrophic failure as observed with
the Mastodon social graph. Although a rare occurrence, we
therefore argue that techniques to avoid overt dependency on
individual hosting ASes would be desirable.
5.2 Breaking the Content Federation
The above process of federation underpins the delivery of
toots across the social graph. For example, when a user shares
a toot, it results in the toot being shared with the instances of
all their followers. Although we obviously cannot validate if a
user reads a toot, we next explore the importance of federation
for propagating content to timelines.
Role of Remote Toots. Aiming to measure the prevalence of
federated remote toots, Figure 14 plots the proportion of home
vs. remote toots taken from the federated timeline (see Sec-
tion 2) of every instance in our dataset, ordered by the per-
centage of home toots. The majority of toots on the federated
timeline are actually generated by remote instances: 78% of
instances produce under 10% of their own toots. In the most
extreme case, we see that 5% of instances are entirely reliant
on remote toots, and generate no home toots themselves. This
suggests that some highly influential central instances operate
as ‘feeders’ to the rest of the network. Also, the more toots
an instance generates, the higher the probability of them be-
ing replicated to other instances (correlation 0.97), thus high-
lighting the importance of a small number of feeders, without
whom smaller instances would be unable to bootstrap. This is
another inherent form of centralisation, which any social sys-
tem will struggle to deviate from.
These results motivate us to measure the impact of instance
and AS failures on toot availability. We evaluate three scenar-
ios: (i) where a toot is exclusively hosted on its home instance,
and fetched by the remote instance on demand (denoted as “no
replication”); (ii) where a toot is actively replicated to any in-
stances with users that follow the toot’s author (“subscription
replication”); and (iii) where a toot is replicated onto a random
set of n instances (“random replication”). Mastodon partly
supports option (ii), but replicated toots are only temporarily
cached and they are not globally indexed, i.e., they are only
visible to users local to the instance where the replica is. For
these experiments, we assume a scenario where toots are glob-
ally indexed, e.g., via a Distributed Hash Table [53], allowing
users to access replicated toots from any instance. For simplic-
ity, we treat all toots as equal, even though in practice more
recent toots are likely to be more important.
No replication. In Figure 15(a), we measure the availability
of toots when removing entire ASes; and in Figure 15(b), we
examine availability of toots when individual instances fail.
Both plots depict results without replication enabled. In both
cases, toot availability declines rapidly in the face of failures.
Removing the top 10 instances (ranked by number of toots)
results in the deletion of 62.69% toots from Mastodon. Re-
moving the top 10 ASes (again, ranked by number of toots)
results in 90.1% of toots becoming unavailable. Therefore, we
argue that running Mastodon without replication is not a viable
option if resilience is to be a priority.
Subscription-based Replication. Figures 15(c) and 15(d) re-
port the availability of toots if they are replicated onto the in-
stances that follow them, i.e., via federated links. We consider
any toot as available if there is at least one live Mastodon in-
stance holding a replica, and assume the presence of a global
index (such as a Distributed Hash Table) to discover toots in
such replicas.
Availability improves using this method. For example, re-
moving the top 10 instances now only results in 2.1% of toots
becoming unavailable (as compared to 62.69% without repli-
cation). The equivalent values when removing the top 10 ASes
are 18.66% with replication (vs. 90.1% without).
Random Replication. Above, we assumed that toots are only
replicated to the followers’ instances. We now experiment with
a random replication strategy that copies each toot onto n ran-
dom instances. We test for n = {1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9}, alongside
no replication (No-rep) and subscription-based replication (S-
Rep). We do this for all toots and present the results in Fig-
ure 16. In each iteration, we remove the current remaining top
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Figure 15: Availability of toots based on (a) removing ASes, with ASes ranked based on #instances, #toots and #users hosted; and (b)
removing instances, ranked by #users, #toots, and #connections with other instances. In (c) and (d), we report the toot availability when
replicating across all instances that follow them.
instance (as ranked by number of toots), and check the avail-
ability of toots according to the different replication strategies.
The figures shows that random replication substantially out-
performs subscription-based replication. This is due to the bi-
ased way that subscription-based replication works, in which
we find that 9.7% of toots have no replication due to a lack
of followers, yet 23% of toots have more than 10 replicas be-
cause they are authored by popular users. After removing 25
instances, subscription-based replication has 95% availability,
whereas 99.2% availability could have been achieved with just
1 random replication. More prominently, subscription-based
replication tends to place all replicas onto a small set of popu-
lar instances (i.e., where the followers are), due to the skewed
popularity distribution of users. This is yet another conse-
quence of the natural centralisation that these systems expe-
rience. Thus, removing these popular instances will remove
not only the original toot but also the replica(s).
In contrast, the random strategy distributes the load more
evenly, such that instance failures impact fewer replicas of the
toots. There are a number of practical concerns that will im-
pact such strategies. Most notably, it would be important to
weight replication based on the resources available at the in-
stance (e.g., storage).
6 Related Work
Decentralised Social Networks. Several efforts have worked
toward building distributed social network platforms. At first,
these were largely peer-to-peer, e.g., LifeSocial.KOM [18] and
PeerSON [7], and relied on entirely decentralised protocols.
Unfortunately, they did not achieve widespread adoption partly
due to challenges related to both performance [4] and reliabil-
ity [25]. Thus, a new wave of DW platforms has emerged that
rely on a server-based federated model, e.g., Mastodon. Before
that, the most successful platform was Diaspora, which saw
growth around 2011 [19]. Diaspora offers Facebook-like func-
tionality using a federated model similar to Mastodon. How-
ever, unlike Mastodon, it relies on bespoke protocols (rather
than standards), and its user population has since stagnated.
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Figure 16: Availability of toots when removing top instances (mea-
sured by #toots) with random replication. Lines for n > 4 overlap
indicating availability above 99% (97%) in case of instance (AS) fail-
ures.
Since Diaspora’s creation, several (semi-)standard federa-
tion protocols have been proposed allowing instances to ex-
change data [41]. These include OStatus [37], which allows
real-time interaction between instances; WebFinger [24] for
discovering information about entities on other instances; and
ActivityPub [1] for publishing information about social activi-
ties. Attempts have also been made to standardise the format of
these data structures, e.g., ActivityStreams [2]. This standard-
isation efforts have had a dramatic impact on the DW. For ex-
ample, both Mastodon and PeerTube use ActivityStreams and
ActivityPub; thus, they can exchange data. An overview of
these various protocol can be found in [21].
Researchers have also looked at security and privacy in the
DW [40, 44], mostly around securing data management. For
example, various projects have attempted to decentralise data,
e.g., DataBox [38], SOLID [32], and SocialGate [26]. These
operate local datastores for individual users, e.g., running on a
physical home appliance. Applications wishing to access user
data must be granted permission, potentially through a prior
negotiation mechanisms.
Social Network Measurements. A number of measurement
studies have analysed “centralised” social networks like Face-
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book [39, 49] and Twitter [10, 15, 27]. These have revealed
a range of properties, including attributes of the social graph
and content generation. Bielenberg et al. performed the first
study of a DW application, Diaspora [5]. When inspecting
its growth, they found a network far smaller than the one we
observe on Mastodon. There has been a small set of recent
works that focus on Mastodon. Zignani et al. collected and
released Mastodon datasets, as well as exploring several fea-
tures, e.g., the social graph, placement of instances and content
warnings [54, 55]. Also, studies have focused on friend recom-
mendations [47] and sentiment analysis [9]. We complement
these works with a focus on availability, covering the key as-
pects of federation. We also inspect the nature and deployment
of instances, as well as their topical interests. To the best of
our knowledge, this paper constitutes the largest study to date
of Mastodon.
7 Conclusion
This paper presented a large-scale measurement study of the
Decentralised Web (DW) through the lens of Mastodon. We
focused on exploring challenges arising from two key innova-
tions introduced by the DW: (i) the decomposition of a global
service into many independent instances; and (ii) the process
of federation, whereby these instances collaborate and interact.
We found that Mastodon’s design decision of giving every-
one the ability to establish an independent instance of their own
has led to an active ecosystem, with instances covering a wide
variety of topics. However, a common theme in our work has
been the discovery of apparent forms of centralisation within
Mastodon. For example, 10% of instances host almost half of
the users, and certain categories exhibit remarkable reliance on
a small set of instances. This extends to hosting practices, with
three ASes hosting almost two third of the users.
Our simulations further confirmed that these natural pres-
sures towards centralisation lead to potential points of failure.
For example, it was possible to reduce the LCC in the federa-
tion graph from 92% of all users to just 46% via the removal
of five ASes. Similarly, outages in just 10 instances can re-
move almost half of all toots. This is not a theoretical prob-
lem: we discovered regular instance (and even occasional AS)
outages. Looking for possible mitigations, we experimented
with simple replication strategies to find that availability can
be dramatically improved by copying toots onto secondary in-
stances, i.e., by reducing the level of centralisation. Interest-
ingly, the subscription-based strategy (loosely employed by
Mastodon currently) is not as effective as a random strategy,
due to the propensity to replicate toots onto the same set of
instances where the followers are based.
We argue that if these problems are ignored, the DW may
risk converging towards a semi-centralised system. As part
of future work, we plan to explore the longer term properties
of the DW more generally. We will also work on mitigations
to some of the identified concerns (beyond the toot replica-
tion discussed in Section 5.2), including decentralised defenses
against, e.g., malicious bots. One example of a possible mitiga-
tion is the existing instance blocking supported by Mastodon;
our future work will investigate the impact that this has on the
social graph and how it can be used to filter malicious content.
Importantly, we argue that mitigations should not depend on
the exposure of user information to remote
As part of future work, we plan to provide a longitudinal
analysis of Mastodon with respect to the issues identified in
this paper as well as study the effect in terms of hate speech of
alt-right communities like Gab [52] starting to use Mastodon
forks [34].
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